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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of
otherwise unrelated products. My analysis predicts that umbrella branding can credibly signal
positive correlation between the qualities of the included products to consumers, but cannot cer-
tify high quality or signal negative quality correlation. Moreover, whenever umbrella branding
signals perfect positive quality correlation, rms that already sell a high (low) quality product
have stronger (weaker) incentives to invest in developing another high quality product than new
entrants.
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1 Introduction
Umbrella branding, the practice of selling several products under the same brand name, is widespread.
Some umbrella brands sell related products, e.g., Sony sells at screen televisions, at screen monitors,
and laptop computers. Others sell products in unrelated categories, e.g., Virgin sells music disks, air
travel, cola drinks, and nancial services.
A commonly advanced rationale for umbrella branding is that it allows rms to leverage the
reputation attached to a brand name (Kapferer 1997; Aaker 2004). Umbrella branding helps rms
with strong brands to successfully introduce new products by convincing consumers that new and
existing products are of similar quality. Empirical and experimental studies conrm that consumers
quality perceptions of a product are correlated with their evaluations of other products sold under
the same umbrella brand. Using scanner panel data of toothpaste and toothbrush sales, Erdem
(1998) estimates a correlation between consumersprior quality perceptions of two umbrella branded
products of 0:88.1 Sullivan (1990) nds that an alleged sudden-acceleration defect of the Audi 4000
model had signicant negative e¤ects on the demands for other models sold under the Audi brand.
In a secondary analysis of eight experimental datasets including the one in Aaker and Kellers (1990)
seminal study on the question, Bottomley and Holden (2001) nd that the perceived quality of the
parent brand has a signicant e¤ect on how consumers evaluate a brand extension.
One potential explanation for correlated perceptions is that a rms skill level or other key inputs
determine the quality of all products it manufactures and umbrella branding informs consumers that
products originate from the same manufacturer. An alternative explanation, which will be the focus
of this paper, is that rms have incentives to only employ umbrella brands for products that are
similar in terms of quality. Correlation hence arises endogenously as a result of rms branding
decisions.
Endogenous quality correlation is relevant because technological quality correlation due to the
use of a common input seems unrealistic in many situations. First, some umbrella branded products
are manufactured by di¤erent rms.2 The AT&T brand for example used to be licensed to VTech
1Using the same dataset, Erdem and Winer (1999) nd further evidence of inter-category correlation of (multiple)
attribute-perceptions for umbrella brands, while Erdem and Sun (2002) show that advertising has an uncertainty-
reducing role across categories for umbrella brands.
2Short of being manufactured by di¤erent rms, some umbrella branded products are manufactured in di¤erent
factories located in di¤erent countries. Many piano brands for instance manufacture their cheaper models in China,
while their higher-end models are manufactured in Japan.
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for telephone sets and to Verbatim for blank media. Second, there are many brands that have been
extended into distant product categories (see Klink and Smith 2001), and evidence from marketing
suggests that even in such situations consumers tend to perceive quality links between umbrella
branded products (see Swaminathan, Fox, and Reddy 2001; Bottomley and Holden 2001). Third,
even products in related categories that are manufactured by the same rm do not always have similar
product features and qualities. Only automatic cars can experience sudden acceleration, for example,
but after the Audi incident mentioned above negative feedback e¤ects also caused a signicant fall in
demand for the Audi Quattro that was only available with standard transmission (see Sullian 1990).
Fourth and maybe most importantly, technological quality correlation makes only partial sense if we
think about quality as the result of investments in product development and choices by the rm.
While some rms may simply lack the skills to develop and produce high-quality products, rms that
possess the required skills are usually also able to produce low quality and can save costs by doing
so. Hence, skill alone is insu¢ cient to explain why products manufactured by the same rm should
share the same high quality.
This paper analyzes whether and when umbrella branding can convince rational consumers that
products are likely to be of similar or identical quality, even in the absence of technological quality
correlation. The model is based on an information asymmetry between rms and consumers. Firms
know the qualities of their products, whereas consumers learn about quality over time through
observations of product performance, which are imperfect signals of quality. Product qualities are
either exogenously given or determined by rmspre-launch investments in product development.
Since rms can condition their branding decisions on qualities, umbrella branding can convey
information to consumers even in the absence of any technological quality correlation. First, the
umbrella branding decision itself may inuence consumersbeliefs about qualities; umbrella branding
has signaling e¤ects in this case. Second, umbrella branding leads to feedback e¤ects whenever
consumers believe that the qualities of the included products are correlated. In the case of positive
quality correlation, the success (failure) of an umbrella branded product has a positive (negative)
feedback e¤ect on consumersbelief about the quality of the other product sold under the same brand
(for evidence of such feedback e¤ects, see Sullivan 1990; John, Loken and Joiner 1998). I analyze the
interplay of these e¤ects in a two-stage game with two products sold either under separate brands
or under an umbrella brand in both periods.
This papers central result is that positive quality correlation can arise endogenously in a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. In particular, for some parameter values there are equilibria in which umbrella
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brands always o¤er products of uniform quality. In these equilibria, the signaling e¤ects are such that
rms of any quality prole could make a short term gain by using an umbrella brand; the expected
long term impact of the branding decision, however, depends on actual qualities. For rms with
one good and one bad product, umbrella branding means putting the future reputation of the good
product at stake by inviting consumers to pool their experiences. If future prots are important,
these rms will therefore prefer separate branding. For rms with two bad products, on the other
hand, the branding decisions expected long term impact can be negligible: if the consumption of
a bad product is su¢ ciently likely to convince consumers of this products low quality, then bad
products can be expected to lose their reputations in the long term irrespectively of the branding
decision. Umbrella branding will then be attractive for rms with only bad products, since it allows
them to reap short term prot gains without incurring any signicant long term losses. Finally,
for rms with two good products, umbrella branding is attractive not only in the short but also in
the long term: thanks to positive feedback e¤ects, these rms expect to consolidate their products
reputations faster under umbrella than under separate branding.
In contrast, there are no counterintuitive equilibria in which successes (failures) have negative
(positive) feedback e¤ects. If consumers expected the qualities of umbrella branded products to be
negatively correlated, then rms with two bad products would benet from positive feedback e¤ects
with a higher likelihood than rms with one or two good products. Moreover, the outside option
of separate branding is always less protable for rms with two bad products than for any other
rm. These arguments imply that umbrella branding would be particularly attractive for rms with
only bad products. Anticipating this, however, consumerswillingness to pay for umbrella branded
products would be low. This in turn would render umbrella branding unprotable for all rms.
The analysis yields several testable implications regarding the circumstances under which um-
brella branding is likely to be protable (absent direct cost considerations) and induce positively
correlated beliefs.3 First, the prior reputation of the sellers existing product must be high enough.
This implies that one would only expect the brands of su¢ ciently popular products to be successfully
extended. Second, the markets for the two products need to be su¢ ciently symmetric in terms of
size. An extension from a mass product to a niche product (or vice versa) cannot be an informative
signal about qualities. Third, the seller must attach su¢ cient weight to both short term and long
term prots from both products. Fourth, consumers must be su¢ ciently uncertain about the qual-
3As is standard in signaling games, babbling equilibria in which umbrella branding happens but is meaningless
exist for all parameter values.
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ities of both products at the time of the brand extension. If consumers are already certain about
the quality of the rms existing product, umbrella branding cannot a¤ect beliefs because the old
products reputation can no longer be put at stake.
The second main result of the paper is that umbrella branding a¤ects sellersincentives to invest
in the quality of new products. Consider a model extension in which producers of new goods choose
their productsqualities prior to selling. Choosing high quality is associated with a xed investment
cost, privately drawn by each producer from a commonly known probability distribution. In this
framework, equilibria in which umbrella branding signals perfect quality correlation continue to exist
for suitable parameter values and all share the following feature. Investing in the new products
quality is more attractive for rms with a good existing product, available for an umbrella brand,
than for mono-product rms: selling a good new product is more protable if you can umbrella
brand it with a good existing product and thereby benet (in expectation) from positive feedback
e¤ects in both directions. Firms that already sell a product of low quality have the lowest investment
incentive. The option to use an umbrella brand hence strengthens the quality investment incentives
of rms that already sell a high quality product, but weakens the quality investment incentives of
rms that currently sell a low quality product.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes
the framework. Section 4 presents the main e¤ects of umbrella branding on beliefs and prots; in
particular, it explains the relationship between the branding strategy, the correlation of consumers
prior quality perceptions, and signaling and feedback e¤ects. Section 5 contains my main results
about the (in)existence of di¤erent types of equilibria. Section 6 extends the basic model in two
directions. First, by endogenizing the quality of new products, and second, by introducing the
possibility that the rm cannot observe the quality of its new product. Section 8 contains concluding
remarks. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
There are two main extant theories of umbrella branding that allow for endogenous quality correlation
while treating product quality as exogenous. Wernerfelt (1988) uses an adverse selection approach
where umbrella branding has a signaling function, whereas Choi (1998) analyzes an innitely repeated
game in which sellers choose brands for new products in every period. Both theories focus on showing
the existence of an equilibrium in which umbrella brands sell only high quality products that never
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fail. To sustain such an equilibrium, Wernerfelts (1988) theory relies on pessimistic o¤-equilibrium
beliefs following the failure of an umbrella branded product, while Chois (1998) model uses the
threat of a severe (o¤-equilibrium) punishment should an umbrella branded product fail.4
A weakness of these theories is that, since umbrella branding is a guarantee of high quality and
good performance, there cannot be any feedback e¤ects between umbrella branded products on the
equilibrium path. This is inconsistent with the empirical evidence that documents successes but
also failures of umbrella branded products and their feedback e¤ects (see for example Sullivan 1990;
John, Locken and Joiner 1998; Swaminathan, Fox, and Reddy 2001). The model I propose aims
to overcome this discrepancy between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence by allowing
consumers to continue learning about quality after the branding decision. Whenever buyers believe
that the qualities of two umbrella branded products are positively correlated, the success (failure)
of one product then has a positive (negative) feedback e¤ect on buyers perception of the other
products quality on the equilibrium path.
Cabral (2000) proposes an alternative theory of umbrella branding that features ongoing learning
and feedback e¤ects (from new on old products, but not vice versa).5 Building on the premise
that the qualities of umbrella branded products are identical for exogenous reasons, he shows that
higher quality sellers have stronger incentives to extend their brands. My paper is complementary to
Cabral (2000). As discussed in the introduction, there are situations in which Cabrals assumption
of perfect exogenous quality correlation makes limited sense. The theory in this paper shows that
the assumption is not needed for consumers to hold correlated beliefs. Moreover, it shows that even
with endogenous quality correlation umbrella branding remains a signal of high quality as predicted
by Cabral (2000): positive quality correlation can only arise in equilibrium if the umbrella branding
decision has signaling e¤ects that imply higher prots in the short term. Finally, my analysis leads
to new empirical predictions, and lends itself to extensions that would not be feasible with exogenous
quality correlation. First, the endogenous choice of the new products quality. Second, a possible
lack of knowledge about the new products quality on the side of the seller, capturing a bad t
between the old and the new product.
Endogenous quality choice is the main topic of Andersson (2002), Hakenes and Peitz (2008),
4Another adverse selection model in which umbrella branding guarantees high quality is Hakenes and Peitz (2009),
which compares umbrella branding with external quality certication. Moorthy (2010) discusses the robustness of
Wernerfelts (1988) results and proposes alternative o¤-equilibrium beliefs.
5In my model, there are feedback e¤ects in both directions. This is necessary to derive endogenous quality corre-
lation.
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Cabral (2009), and Rasmusen (2010). The key insight of that literature is that umbrella branding can
expand the scope for quality provision when rms simultaneously choose both productsqualities.6
My analysis of quality provision is di¤erent: the existing products quality is given by past decisions,
and the prediction is that umbrella branding strengthens the incentives to invest in the quality of
the new product only if the exiting product is already of high quality. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the rst paper in the branding literature to identify a link between rmsincentives to invest
in the qualities of new products and the qualities of their existing products.
Other functions of umbrella branding in the literature are the reduction of uncertainty, either
about horizontal product characteristics (Sappington and Wernerfelt 1985) or about quality (Mont-
gomery and Wernerfelt 1992), and the exploitation of the intrinsic value (status or otherwise) of a
brand (Pepall and Richards 2002). Rotemberg (2010) analyzes umbrella branding when rms are
concerned with being perceived as altruistic towards customers.
3 Framework
I consider a two-period model. At the beginning of period t = 1, a xed measure of rms, each
endowed with one "new" product, is born. In addition, there is a xed measure of incumbent rms
in the economy, each selling one "old" product. One of these incumbents also gets endowed with a
new product at the beginning of period t = 1.7 The focus of the analysis will be the branding decision
of this multi-product rm.8 Following the branding decision, all products are sold in periods t = 1
and t = 2.
All products are experience goods, each of either good or bad quality. Only rms observe the
qualities of their products. Quality determines the relative probabilities of the two possible perfor-
mance outcomes, success (S) and failure (F ). A good product generates a success, i.e. works well,
6In Andersson (2002), Cabral (2009), and Rasmusen (2010), the basic mechanism ressembles that in Bernheim and
Whinston (1990)s analysis of collusion under multimarket contact. Hakenes and Peitz (2008), using the assumption
that high quality products never fail, rely on pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs following the failure of one or both
umbrella branded products.
7The analysis would be unchanged if instead of just one incumbent, a countable (i.e., measure zero) set of incumbents
were endowed with a second product. The results would also continue to hold if each incumbent rm were endowed
with a new product with a strictly positive but su¢ ciently small probability.
8The analysis would be the same if instead of being endowed with a second product, an incumbent got randomly
matched with an entrant to negotiate a brand licensing agreement (assuming the rms can observe each others
qualities).
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with probability g 2 (0; 1), while a bad product is successful with a lower probability b 2 (0; g). Con-
ditional on quality, performances are distributed i.i.d. across periods. In each period, all consumers
observe the same product performance, i.e., performance is batch or product generation specic.
Consumersprior belief about the quality of new products is  2 (0; 1). At the beginning of period
t = 1, consumers hence assign probability  to any new product being good.
The old product of the multi-product rm, henceforth also simply referred to as "the rm", has
reputation r 2 (0; 1) at the beginning of period t = 1.9 The rms strategy consists of whether or
not to extend its existing brand to its new product, given the qualities qo 2 fb; gg and qn 2 fb; gg of
its old and its new product, respectively. Formally, xqoqn 2 [0; 1] will denote the probability that the
rm chooses an umbrella brand if the product qualities are qo and qn. The rms umbrella branding
strategy is hence a vector (xgg; xgb; xbg; xbb) that gives the probability of a brand extension for every
possible quality prole (qo; qn). For expositional simplicity, this paper will focus on pure strategies,
i.e., xqoqn 2 f0; 1g for all (qo; qn), unless explicitly mentioned otherwise.
Following Tadelis (1999) and Cabral (2000), I assume that consumers do not observe the ownership
of each brand. This means that consumers connect two products to the same rm if and only if the
rm uses an umbrella brand. If the rm decides to introduce its new product under a separate
brand, consumers are unaware that the rm decided against an umbrella brand. This assumption
is appropriate for fast moving consumer goods, where rms that have several brands often try to
"hide" from consumers that these brands belong to the same rm and consumers are unlikely to
expend e¤ort to track products back to their producers. In my framework, this assumption implies
that the absence of an umbrella brand does not lead consumers to revise their initial beliefs  and r.
Consumersinformation set prior to consumption in period 1 thus includes the observation that a
rm uses an umbrella brand if that is the case and nothing otherwise. Prior to period 2 consumption
decisions, consumers update their beliefs based on the product performances in period 1. The period
1 performances of the two products sold by the multi-product incumbent whose strategy I consider
will be denoted by o 2 fF; Sg and n 2 fF; Sg. Table 1 summarizes the timing.
All consumers have unit demands for all products, and the consumption of a well functioning
product procures a utility of one while consumption of a failing product procures zero utility. A
9The reputations of other old products at the beginning of period t = 1 can be di¤erent from r. Since past
performances determine the beliefs about old products, it would be inapproriate to impose that consumers hold the
same beliefs about all old products.
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TABLE 1 Timing
t = 1 The firm is endowed with a new product of quality qn and extends its brand with probability xqoqn .
Consumers observe brand names and buy one unit of each product.
Consumers observe performances ao and an.
t = 2 Consumers buy one unit of each product.
consumers willingness to pay for a product with reputation  is thus
w()  g + (1  )b:
In every period, the rms make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to consumers and therefore optimally set
each products price equal to consumerswillingness to pay for that product.10 Production costs are
zero.
Firms attach weight  2 (0; 1) to second period prots. Moreover, the markets for the di¤erent
products that the multi-product rm sells can be asymmetric. The share of the market for the new
product in the rms total sales is denoted by  2 (0; 1). Normalizing the total number of units that
the multi-product rms sells in the two periods to one, consumers then buy (1   )(1   ) units of
its old product in period 1, (1   ) units of its new product in period 1, (1   ) units of its old
product in period 2, and  units of its new product in period 2.
The analysis will focus on equilibria in which the rm uses umbrella branding with positive
probability, i.e., xqo;qn > 0 for some (qo; qn).
11 Since g; b 2 (0; 1), such equilibria do not contain any
o¤-equilibrium beliefs. A (Bayesian) equilibrium consists of a belief system and an umbrella branding
strategy (xgg; xgb; xbg; xbb) such that (i) the branding strategy maximizes the rms expected prots
given beliefs, and (ii) beliefs are Bayesian consistent given the branding strategy.
10This way of modeling demand and prices is common in the theoretical literature on brands (see Tadelis 1999;
Cabral 2000, 2009; Hakenes and Peitz 2007, 2008, 2009). It allows me to set aside prices as quality signals, an issue
dealt with extensively elsewhere in the literature (Wolinsky 1983; Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Bagwell and Riordan
1991).
11Pooling equilibria in which xqo;qn = 0 for all (qo; qn) obviously always exist if the o¤-equilibrium beliefs following
a deviation to umbrella branding are su¢ ciently pessimistic. A more interesting question is to establish conditions for
the existence of equilibria in which umbrella branding happens.
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4 Signaling and Feedback E¤ects
4.1 The Impact of Umbrella Branding on Beliefs
Umbrella branding can induce two types of e¤ects on beliefs. First, the decision to umbrella brand
on its own may be a quality signal. For the new product, for example, such a signaling e¤ect occurs
whenever consumers believe that a new product introduced under an umbrella brand is either more
or less likely to be of high quality than new products carrying unknown brand names. These signaling
e¤ects are relevant both for rst and second period beliefs.
Second, umbrella branding leads feedback e¤ects whenever consumers believe that the qualities
of umbrella branded products are correlated. The success or failure of one product, say the new
product, then induces consumers to revise their beliefs not only about the new product itself but
also about the old product. Since these feedback e¤ects are linked to performance observations that
rst occur at the end of period one, feedback e¤ects are only relevant for the analysis of second period
beliefs.
Period 1 To analyze the short term signaling e¤ects of umbrella branding, I compare consumers
beliefs at the beginning of the rst period under umbrella branding and under separate branding. As
explained in the previous section, consumers do not revise their priors r and  about the qualities
of the multi-product rms products if the rm uses separate brands. Confronted with an umbrella
brand, however, consumers possibly revise their beliefs about both productsqualities. Whenever
brand extensions happen with positive probability in equilibrium, all beliefs can be obtained by
Bayesian updating. I denote by qoqn the probability consumers assign to the quality prole (qo; qn)
if they observe an umbrella brand; for example:12
gg =
rxgg
rxgg + r(1  )xgb + (1  r)xbg + (1  r)(1  )xbb :
12The probabilities consumers assign to the quality proles other than (g; g) are
gb =
r(1  )xgb
rxgg + r(1  )xgb + (1  r)xbg + (1  r)(1  )xbb ;
bg =
(1  r)xbg
rxgg + r(1  )xgb + (1  r)xbg + (1  r)(1  )xbb ; and
bb =
(1  r)(1  )xbb
rxgg + r(1  )xgb + (1  r)xbg + (1  r)(1  )xbb :
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To simplify notations, let me denote the aggregate belief that the old product of the umbrella brand
is good by
o = gg + gb;
and the belief that the new product is good by
n = gg + bg:
Umbrella branding has a positive signaling e¤ect on the new product if and only if it improves
the consumersbelief about the quality of the new product, i.e., whenever
n > :
This condition is satised whenever, given the prior r about the quality of the old product, a brand
extension is more likely to involve a good rather than a bad new product:
rxgg + (1  r)xbg > rxgb + (1  r)xbb:
Similarly, the signaling e¤ect on the core product is positive if and only if
o > r:
Period 2 After period 1 consumption, consumers observe the performances of both products.
They then update their beliefs so as to take into account these additional pieces of information in
the second period.
Under separate branding, the updating of beliefs is "standard" in the sense that consumers only
take into account each products own performance. If the old product succeeds in the rst period,
for example, consumers update their belief that the old product is of high quality from r to
S(r)  rg
rg + (1  r)b .
Similarly, if the new product fails, consumers revise their belief that it is of high quality from  to
F ()  (1  g)
(1  g) + (1  )(1  b) .
The updated belief after a failure of the old product is then F (r), and the updated belief following
a success of the new product is S().
Under umbrella branding, consumers update their period 1 beliefs o and n not only taking into
account each products own performance, but possibly also the brands overall performance. Consider
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consumersbelief about the old product after a success of this product for example. If consumers
ignored the new products performance, then their second period belief would simply be S(o).
Now suppose that the new product was successful, too, and that consumers use this additional
information. In that case, the belief consumers hold about the old product "before" taking account
of the old products own performance, is no longer o but instead
oS =
ggg + gbb 
gg + bg

g + (gb + bb)b
.
The "nal" belief consumers assign to the core product being good if both products were successful
in the rst period is then simply
S(
o
S) =
ggg
2 + gbgb
ggg
2 + gbgb+ bgbg + bbb
2
:
The success of the new product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the old product if and only if
oS > 
o.
The beliefs consumers hold about the quality of the new product, or after observing di¤erent
performance outcomes, can be obtained using the same hypothetical two-step procedure. First,
the observation of product  is performance  i has a feedback e¤ect on the belief about product
is quality (i 6=  i), captured by the revision from i to i i.13 Second, consumers update their
belief to take into account product is own performance i, which amounts to a revision from i i
to i(
i
 i). The following table summarizes second period beliefs as a function of the pieces of
information (umbrella versus separate branding, and the productsperformances) consumers have:
S of old, S of new S of old, F of new F of old, S of new F of old, F of new
umbrella brand S(
o
S); S(
n
S) S(
o
F ); F (
n
S) F (
o
S); S(
n
F ) F (
o
F ); F (
n
F )
separate brands S(r); S() S(r); F () F (r); S() F (r); F ()
13In the cases ignored so far, the beliefs after the rst step of the revision are
oF =
gg(1  g) + gb(1  b) 
gg + bg

(1  g) + (gb + bb)(1  b)
;
nS =
ggg + bgb 
gg + gb

g + (bg + bb)b
; and
nF =
gg(1  g) + bg(1  b) 
gg + gb

(1  g) + (bg + bb)(1  b)
:
11
After any realization of performances, the e¤ect of umbrella branding on the second period belief
about each product can then be decomposed into two e¤ects. Following two successes, for example,
the impact of umbrella branding on the old products reputation is
S(
o
S)  S(r) = [S(oS)  S(o)] + [S(o)  S(r)] :
The rst term between brackets is positive if and only if the success of the new product has a positive
feedback e¤ect on the old product. The second term is positive if and only if umbrella branding has
a positive signaling e¤ect on the old product.
Quality Correlation and Feedback E¤ects Calculating the correlation coe¢ cient between
the (prior) quality perceptions of umbrella branded products yields
 =
ggbb   gbbgq
(gg + gb)  (gg + gb)2
q
(gg + bg)  (gg + bg)2
: (1)
This correlation is positive if and only if
ggbb > gbbg:
Relying on this simply condition, it is straightforward to check that for any i 2 fo; ng,
iS > 
i > iF if and only if  > 0,
iS = 
i = iF if and only if  = 0;
iS < 
i < iF if and only if  < 0:
(2)
If consumers believe that the qualities of umbrella branded products are positively correlated ( > 0),
then successes have positive feedback e¤ects. Conversely, if  < 0, then the success of any one of the
products has a negative feedback e¤ect on the other products reputation. For  = 0, there are no
feedback e¤ects at all.
4.2 The Impact of Umbrella Branding on Prots
Given beliefs, one can analyze the rms incentive to use an umbrella brand by considering the
marginal impact of umbrella branding on expected aggregate prots. I denote by 1 the di¤erence
between the rst period prots under umbrella branding and under separate branding:
1 = (1  ) [w(o)  w(r)] +  [w(n)  w()] :
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Similarly, 2(o; n) denotes the (ex post) di¤erence in second period prots between umbrella and
separate branding, following the performance prole (o; n):
2(o; n) = (1  )

w
 
o(
o
n)
  w (o(r))+  w  n(no)  w (n()) :
For example,
2(S; F ) = (1  ) [w (S(oF ))  w (S(r))] +  [w (F (nS))  w (F ())] :
Finally, (qo; qn) denotes the total di¤erence in expected prots between umbrella and separate
branding, which is equal to the weighted sum of the rst period and expected second period prot
di¤erences:
(qo; qn) = (1  )1 + E[2(o; n) j qo; qn]; (3)
where
E[2(o; n) j qo; qn] = qoqn2(S; S) + qo(1  qn)2(S; F )
+(1  qo)qn2(F; S) + (1  qo)(1  qn)2(F; F ):
The branding strategy (xgg; xgb; xbg; xbb) is optimal if and only if for all (qo; qn):
xqoqn =
8>><>>:
1 if (qo; qn) > 0;
any " 2 [0; 1] if (qo; qn) = 0;
0 if (qo; qn) < 0:
(4)
The Umbrella Branding Strategy and Quality Correlation The next step is to link the
branding strategy to the correlation of consumersquality perceptions. It is easy to check that
 > 0 if and only if xggxbb > xgbxbg: (5)
Perfect positive correlation ( = 1) obtains for any branding strategy such that xgb = xbg = 0
but xgg; xbb > 0. Perfect negative correlation ( =  1) obtains for any branding strategy such
that umbrella branding always involves products of opposite qualities, i.e., if xgg = xbb = 0 but
xgb; xbg > 0.
The Prot Impact of Signaling and Feedback E¤ects To illustrate the impact of the
signaling and feedback e¤ects on prots, note rst that in
1 = (1  ) [w(o)  w(r)]| {z }
short run price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the old product
+ [w(n)  w()]| {z }
short run price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the new product
;
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the rst term is positive if and only if the signaling e¤ect on the core product is positive, and the
second term is positive if and only if the signaling e¤ect on the extension product is positive.
The expected second period prot di¤erence can be decomposed as follows:
E[2(o; n) j qo; qn] =
(1  ) E w  o(on)  w (o(o)) j qo; qn| {z }
expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on the old product
+(1  ) E [w (o(o))  w (o(r)) j qo]| {z }
expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the old product
+ E

w
 
n(
n
o)
  w (n(n)) j qo; qn| {z }
expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on the new product
+ E [w (n(
n))  w (n()) j qn]| {z }
expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the new product
Since S () and F () are both increasing, the "expected long term price impact of the signaling
e¤ect on the old product" is positive if and only if o > r. Similarly, for the new product, the
expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect is positive if and only if n > . The signs of
these e¤ects are hence independent of the concerned productsquality; their magnitudes, however,
generally vary with quality.
As already explained in the section on beliefs, given the sign of the correlation coe¢ cient , it is
easy to assess the signs of the two feedback e¤ects ex post. For  > 0, for example, a success of the
extension product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the (price of the) core product. The following
lemma shows that knowledge of the quality of product  i is su¢ cient to also assess the "expected
price impact of the feedback e¤ect on product i":
Lemma 1  For  > 0, the expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on product i 2 fo; ng is
positive if and only if product  i 6= i is good. Formally, for any qo 2 fb; gg :
E

w
 
o(
o
n)
  w (o(o)) j qo; qn > 0 if and only if qn = g;
and for any qn 2 fb; gg:
E

w
 
n(
n
o)
  w (n(n)) j qo; qn > 0 if and only if qo = g:
 For  < 0, the expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on product i 2 fo; ng is positive
if and only if product  i 6= i is bad.
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In some instances, Lemma 1 will prove helpful in evaluating the total impact of umbrella branding
on prots: the Lemma implies for example that if (i)  > 0 and (ii) both signaling e¤ects are non-
negative, then (gg) > 0.
5 Equilibria
5.1 Positive Quality Correlation
In this section, I rst discusses some general characteristics of equilibria with positive quality corre-
lation ( > 0) and then provide conditions under which an equilibrium with perfect positive quality
correlation exists.
In any equilibrium with positive quality correlation, umbrella branding must be protable if both
products are of the same quality. Hence, the following two conditions must be met:
(g; g)  0; and (b; b)  0: (6)
Intuitively, the condition (g; g)  0 is easy to satisfy. If  > 0 in equilibrium, then feedback e¤ects
have a positive expected long term impact for a rm with two good products (see Lemma 1). Hence,
as long as the signaling e¤ects are not too adverse, umbrella branding is protable for a rm with
two good products.
It is more di¢ cult to induce a rm with two bad products to umbrella brand: by Lemma 1, the
expected total impact of the feedback e¤ects is negative for such a rm. For the condition (b; b)  0
to hold in spite of this, umbrella branding must have a positive signaling e¤ect on at least one of the
products. This implies the following result:
Lemma 2 If  > 0 in equilibrium, then umbrella branding has a positive signaling e¤ect on the old
and/or the new product.
This implication is consistent with the empirical evidence, which suggests that extending a brand
can bring benets for existing products (Sullivan 1990; Balachander and Ghose 2003), and that on
average products introduced as brand extensions meet more initial success than products carrying
unknown brand names (Claycamp and Liddy 1969; Smith and Park 1992).14
14Smith and Park (1992) also nd that "the brand extension-new brand di¤erential in the revenue component of
cash ow widens as brand strength increases". Interpreting brand strength as the initial reputation r of the core
product, this nding is consistent with positive quality correlation: as can be easily checked, the signaling e¤ect on
the new product, n   , increases in r in any equilibrium with  > 0.
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For positive quality correlation to arise, it is also necessary that
(g; b)  0; or/and (b; g)  0: (7)
Intuitively, it seems di¢ cult to reconcile any one of these conditions with (b; b)  0: failures have
negative feedback e¤ects here, and failures are most likely when both products are bad. To explain
why a rm with products of di¤ering qualities may nevertheless have lower incentives to use umbrella
brands than a rm with two bad products, one needs to consider the sizes of these expected negative
feedback e¤ects. To x ideas, let me focus on candidate equilibria in which xgb < 1, which requires
that (g; b)  0. In any such equilibrium, it must be that
(b; b)  (g; b): (8)
This condition is equivalent to
E [2(o; n) j b; b]  E [2(o; n) j g; b] ;
or
bE [2(S; n) j qn = b] + (1  b)E [2(F; n) j qn = b]
 gE [2(S; n) j qn = b] + (1  g)E [2(F; n) j qn = b] :
Clearly, the latter condition holds if and only if
E [2(F; n) j qn = b]  E [2(S; n) j qn = b] . (9)
Hence, given the new product is bad, umbrella branding must be less attractive relative to separate
branding if the old product succeeds than if it fails. How is this possible, given that a success of
the old product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the new product under umbrella branding?15 If
qn = b, then the new product is likely to fail, which induces a negative feedback e¤ect under umbrella
branding. The key point is that this negative feedback e¤ect from the new on the old product can
be stronger if the old product succeeds than if it fails. If the old products failure already gives
consumers a strong indication of bad quality, then the new products failure merely provides some
additional evidence pointing into the same direction. If the old product succeeds, however, then the
15Any success (failure) also has a positive (negative) direct e¤ect on the product concerned itself. The branding
decision can have an impact on the size, but not the sign, of this e¤ect. My discussion in the main text focuses on
feedback e¤ects instead, since these are key to understanding endogenous quality correlation.
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negative feedback e¤ect can severely damage the old products reputation. Intuitively, this is the
case if consumers expect a strong quality correlation and failures are strong indications of low quality
while successes leave open the possibility that the product is bad. Separate branding can then be
attractive for a mixed quality rm because it allows the rm to shelter the reputation of the good
product.
The following proposition shows that for g su¢ ciently close to 1, there indeed always exists a
non-empty set of values of the other parameters such that in equilibrium umbrella branding signals
that products are of identical qualities:
Proposition 1 There exist thresholds r (; ) 2 (0; 1), b(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1), (r; ; ; b) 2 (0; 1) and
(r; ; ; b) 2 ((); 1) such that for g su¢ ciently close to 1, a (pure strategy) equilibrium with  = 1
exists if
i) r is high enough so that, given the branding strategy (1; 0; 0; 1), the decision to umbrella brand
increases short term prots:
1 > 0$ r > r (; ) :
ii) quality di¤erences are su¢ ciently large:
b 2  0; b(r; ; ) ; and
iii) the rm attaches su¢ cient weight to both present and future prots:
(r; ; ; b) <  < (r; ; ; b):
The condition that g is close to 1 ensures that failures are su¢ ciently strong indications of low
quality. This implies that if the performances of two umbrella branded products di¤er, the negative
feedback e¤ect from the failure dominates the positive feedback e¤ect from the success. In the
limit, for g equal to 1, consumers will always conclude that both products are bad. Therefore,
2(F; S) and 2(S; F ) are negative for large enough g. Moreover, two failures almost fully convince
consumers that both products are bad, under umbrella as well as under separate branding. Hence,
limg!12(F; F ) = 0. Condition ii) in Proposition 1 ensures that bad products fail with a high
enough probability. This implies that rms with products of di¤ering qualities are indeed very likely
to experience one success and one failure, and will hence lose prots in the long term by opting for
an umbrella brand. For rms with two bad products, on the other hand, two failures are su¢ ciently
more likely, so that the long term e¤ect of umbrella branding is small.
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Condition i) guarantees that 1 > 0, which implies that for su¢ ciently low discount factors
umbrella branding is protable for rms with two bad products. If both products are bad but the
initial belief r happens to be high enough due to luck in the past, it is optimal to umbrella brand to
maximally exploit the brands existing reputation in the short run. However, for too low discount
factors, 1 > 0 implies that umbrella branding would also be protable for rms with products
of di¤ering qualities; condition iii) is therefore needed to ensure that the discount factor lies in an
intermediate range.
Before moving to negative quality correlation, let me make some remarks on the existence of
positive quality correlation equilibria di¤erent from the one in Proposition 1. First, mixed strategy
equilibria such that  = 1 can also exist. The su¢ cient conditions for such equilibria are qualitatively
similar to those in Proposition 1 (except that the condition (b; b) = 0 now exactly pins down the
discount factor given all other parameters). In such equilibria, xgg = 1 and xbb 2 (0; 1). To see why
xgg = 1, note that the proof of Proposition 1 does not rely on the purity of the equilibrium strategy
to show that 1 > 0 is a necessary condition for an equilibrium with perfect correlation and that
1 > 0 implies limg!1(g; g) > 0, which in turn implies xgg = 1. Second, there can be equilibria in
which  2 (0; 1). In particular, any strategy (1; xgb; xbg; xbb) such that  > 0 and at most one rm
type mixes is an equilibrium under conditions that are qualitatively similar those in Proposition 1.16
5.2 Negative Quality Correlation: An Inexistence Result
Whenever  < 0, successes (failures) have negative (positive) feedback e¤ects. This is clearly counter-
intuitive, and the empirical and experimental evidence strongly indicates the opposite. It turns out
that (unlike in some existing frameworks) negative quality equilibria cannot exist in my model. This
implies that no equilibrium selection criterion needs to be invoked to rule out such counterintuitive
situations.
Proposition 2 There does not exist any equilibrium in which  < 0.
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider perfect negative correlation rst. In
that case, umbrella branding convinces consumers that one product is good and one product is bad,
without them knowing which product is the good one. If the rm chooses umbrella branding, the
success of product i 6=  i 2 fo; ng then has a positive direct impact on consumersbelief about is
16Obviously, xgb can be di¤erent from xbg in any such equilibrium only if r 6=  and/or  6= 12 ; otherwise, there are
only three distinct rm types.
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quality that is exactly equal to its negative feedback e¤ect on consumersbelief about product  i.
Under separate branding, on the other hand, successes have positive direct e¤ects but no negative
feedback e¤ects. This implies that a rm with two bad products has a stronger incentive to umbrella
brand than either a rm with a good old and a bad new product and/or a rm with a bad old and
good new product.17 In other words, umbrella branding is particularly attractive for rms with two
bad products, since (i) the outside option of separate branding is less attractive for the (b; b)-type
than for any other type, and (ii) successes, which are more likely to be experienced by rms with
one good product, induce large negative feedback e¤ects under umbrella branding.
Firms with two bad products hence cannot be kept from umbrella branding in any candidate
equilibrium with negative quality correlation. For xbb = 1, however, there does not exist any equilib-
rium such that  < 0 either. The reason is that signaling e¤ects decrease in xbb, and it is impossible
to o¤set this stigmatization of umbrella brands by means of a high xgg without inducing positive
quality correlation.
5.3 Equilibria without Feedback E¤ects
There are potentially two kinds of equilibria without feedback e¤ects ( = 0): (i) equilibria in which
umbrella branding allows consumers to fully infer the quality of one or both products, and (ii)
babblingequilibria in which umbrella branding happens but has no impact on beliefs and prices.
A multi-product rm would clearly like consumers to believe that both its products are good.
However, even a rm with one or several bad products wants consumers to hold such beliefs, and
the certication provided by umbrella branding would actually be more valuable for such a rm
than for one with good products: since under separate branding consumers are more likely to revise
their beliefs downwards when products are bad rather than good, the outside option of separate
branding is less attractive the higher the number of bad products. As a result, there cannot be any
equilibrium in which umbrella branding signals that both products are good. By the same reasoning,
umbrella branding cannot guarantee the quality of only one of the two products either. The following
proposition summarizes this discussion (a formal proof can be found in the appendix):
Proposition 3 There does not exist any equilibrium in which umbrella branding fully reveals the
high quality of the old and/or the new product.
17The relative importance  of the di¤erent products determines whether (b; b) > (g; b) or (b; b) > (b; g) or
both. For  = 12 , both inequalities hold.
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Note that this result relies on the assumption that good products can fail (possibly with a very
small probability), so that consumers who are convinced a product is good do not revise their beliefs
downwards even after observing a failure. If g were exactly equal to 1, then an equilibrium in which
umbrella branding guarantees high quality could be sustained by specifying su¢ ciently pessimistic
o¤-equilibrium beliefs following the failure of an umbrella branded product (see Wernerfelt 1988;
Hakenes and Peitz 2008; Moorthy 2010).
Babbling equilibria, on the other hand, always exist. If xqoqn = 1 for all (qo; qn), then umbrella
branding does not a¤ect beliefs. This in turn implies that the rm is indi¤erent between umbrella
branding and separate branding, so the strategy is indeed optimal. The following proposition provides
a number of structural conditions under which only babbling equilibria exist:
Proposition 4 Any equilibrium is a babbling equilibrium if - ceteris paribus - one of the following
conditions is satised:
i) The markets for the old and for the new product are too asymmetric, i.e.,  is too close to 0 or
to 1:
ii) The consumersprior about one of the products is already very accurate, i.e., r is too close to 1
or to 0, or  is too close to 1 or to 0.
iii) Firms are too impatient, i.e.,  is too close to 0.
iv) Quality di¤erences are too small, i.e., b is too close to g.
For umbrella branding to a¤ect beliefs, the rms branding incentives must depend on its quality
prole. This requires that prots are su¢ ciently responsive to the performances of both products. A
prerequisite for this is of course that beliefs are su¢ ciently responsive to performances. It is easy to
see why this cannot be the case in the last two situations treated in the proposition. For b too close
to g, beliefs hardly respond to performance observations. If  is too close to 0, then intertemporal
prots are not at all responsive to performances, as future prots do not receive any weight. These
two necessary conditions for a non-babbling equilibrium echo conditions ii) and iii) of Proposition 1.
If consumers are already very well-informed about the quality of one of the products (case ii)),
then (i) umbrella branding cannot a¤ect the price of this product in either the short or the long run,18
18John, Loken and Joiner (1998) provide experimental evidence that extreme beliefs and beliefs about agship
products, which can be expected to be more precise than beliefs about other products, are resistant to negative
feedback e¤ects from extension products that do not share the core products quality attributes.
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and (ii) beliefs almost do not respond to this products performance. This means that the signaling
e¤ect on the other product will drive the branding decision. Since the sign of that e¤ect is the same
for all quality proles, however, there is no way to induce some rm types to umbrella brand with
a higher probability than other rm types, which would be necessary to create a signaling e¤ect in
the rst place. Smith and Park (1992) provide evidence consistent with result ii) of Proposition 1 in
a study based on survey data about a large range of consumer products. They nd that the better
consumersknowledge of the new product the weaker are the e¤ects of brand extensions.19
Finally, if markets are very asymmetric, branding decisions depend almost exclusively on the
prot impact on one single product. Consider a brand extension from a mass category to a niche
category for example ( close to 0). Then, the performance of the new product matters mainly
because of its feedback e¤ect on the old product. The old products performance, on the other
hand, is important mainly with respect to its impact on the belief about the old product itself.
Performances thus have two instead of four relevant e¤ects on prots, which, as shown in the proof
of Proposition 4, does not su¢ ce to sustain a non-babbling equilibrium.
Since no negative quality correlation equilibria exist, Proposition 4 implies that the following
conditions are necessary for a positive quality correlation equilibrium: (i) the rm puts su¢ cient
weight on the prots from selling both the old and the new product, (ii) the rm puts su¢ cient
weight on future prots, (iii) consumers are relatively ill-informed about both productsqualities at
the moment of the brand extension, and (iv) good products are su¢ ciently superior to bad products.
6 Extensions
6.1 Investments in Product Quality
This section considers a model extension that endogenizes the qualities of new products. The key
di¤erence with respect to the baseline model is that prior to product launch any rm endowed with
a new product, i.e., the multi-product rm and every entrant, must decide whether to make a one-
time investment to ensure that qn = g; absent the investment, qn = b. For each rm, the cost c
of the quality-improving investment is a random draw from the uniform distribution with support
19Note that condition ii) of Proposition 4 does not contradict condition i) of Proposition 1. For any r that satises
condition i) of Proposition 1, there exists a set of the other parameter values such that perfect positive quality
correlation is an equilibrium. Keeping all other parameters xed, however, a perfect quality correlation equilibrium
can only exist if r is not too close to 1.
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[0;  (g   b)], where the upper bound is chosen so as to equal the prot (and welfare) gain from the
investment under symmetric information.
All rms with new products observe their realization of c prior to the investment decision stage.
The multi-product incumbent makes the investment and branding decisions simultaneously.20 Con-
sumers cannot observe investment decision and product qualities, but are aware of the probability
distribution of the investment cost. A strategy for an entrant consists of an investment decision rule
as a function of the realization of c. A strategy for the multi-product incumbent rm consists of a
rule determining both the investment and the umbrella branding decision as a function of c and qo.
In equilibrium, each rm chooses a strategy that maximizes its expected prots given beliefs, and
beliefs are Bayesian consistent with the rmsstrategies.21
My goal is to nd out whether and how the investment incentives of a multi-product incumbent
depend on qo, and how they compare to the incentives of an entrant. Since the investment cost
is random, any set of strategies induces three investment probabilities: one for entrants, one for
the multi-product rm if qo = g, and one the multi-product rm if qo = b. These probabilities
will be denoted by i, ig, and ib, respectively. As before, perfect positive quality correlation means
that gg; bb > 0 while gb = bg = 0, where these beliefs now depend on the anticipated joint
investment/branding decision of the multi-product rm.
Proposition 5 Suppose an equilibrium in which umbrella branding signals perfect quality correlation
exists. Then,
ib  i  ig
and 0 < i < 1 in this equilibrium.
Proposition 5 shows that in any equilibrium with perfect positive quality correlation having the
option to use an umbrella brand a¤ects the optimal investment decision. In particular, the umbrella
branding option introduces a tendency to align the new products quality to that of the existing
product. In fact, the inequalities in Proposition 5 are strict whenever the multi-product rm has
a strict preference for umbrella branding when both products are good and a strict preference for
separate branding when both products are bad.
The intuition is straightforward. Given perfect quality correlation, a rm with the option to
umbrella brand faces the choice between (i) selecting quality qn = qo and umbrella branding, or (ii)
20Nothing would change if the rm made the investment decision prior to the branding decision.
21Note that each rms prot-maximizing investment strategy depends on consumersbeliefs but not on the other
rmsinvestment decisions.
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qn 6= qo and separate branding. Moreover, in equilibrium the branding decision has to be optimal
given the (simultaneous) investment decision.22 A rm that can umbrella brand its new product with
a good old product has a higher investment incentive than a single-product entrant because umbrella
branding increases the value of the investment beyond what the entrant can expect. For a rm with
a bad old product, the situation is exactly the reverse: the option to umbrella brand, chosen only if
the investment is not made, increases the expected relative value of having two bad products.
Given the existence result for equilibria with perfect quality correlation in the baseline model
(Proposition 1), it is not surprising that in the extended model there exist parameter values for
which perfect quality correlation arises in equilibrium; in particular, this is again the case if failures
are su¢ ciently strong indications of low quality, i.e., for g close enough to 1. Consider the following
example:
Numerical Example For the parameter values r = 0:65,  =  = 0:5, g = 0:999999, and b = 0:2,
there exists an equilibrium in which the rmsstrategies are as follows:23
 If you are an entrant, invest in the quality of the new product if and only if c < bc ' 0:15.
 If you are an incumbent with an old product of quality qo = g, invest in the quality of the new
product and umbrella brand if c < bcg ' 0:27; otherwise, do not invest and sell the two products
under separate brands.
 If you are an incumbent with an old product of quality qo = b, invest in the quality of the new
product and sell under separate brands if c < bcb ' 0:14; otherwise, do not invest and sell the
two products under an umbrella brand.
The corresponding equilibrium investment probabilities are ig ' 0:68, i ' 0:37, and ib ' 0:35. In
expectation, the rm with the umbrella branding option invests more often than an entrant:
rig + (1  r) ib ' 0:56 > i ' 0:37:
6.2 Fit between Products
A central theme in the empirical and experimental marketing literature on branding is that the t
between the old and the new product is a predictor of how correlated consumersquality beliefs are.
22If, given the investment decision, rms had an incentive to opt for a di¤erent branding decision ex post, then their
(joint investment and branding) strategy would clearly not be optimal.
23For these parameter values, there are no other pure strategy equilibria with feedback e¤ects.
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The better the t between products in terms of product characteristics, the higher the likelihood
that umbrella branding permits a rm to leverage brand equity.
Formalizing this argument has proved di¢ cult, however. Sappington andWernerfelt (1985) model
t in a somewhat ad hoc way by assuming that incongruent extensions create "image costs", but
overall the theoretical literature has largely ignored the question. The goal of this section is to propose
a simple extension of the baseline model that takes a rst step towards integrating the notion of t
into an information-based theory of branding. The focus will be on t on the production side, as
captured by perceived similarities in manufacturing in the experimental literature (see Bottomley
and Holden 2001).24
Suppose that with probability 1   k 2 [0; 1] the multi-product rm is unable to observe the
quality of the new product it is endowed with. In the baseline model, k = 1. For k < 1, the branding
strategy is of the form (xgg; xgb; xbg; xbb; yg; yb), where yg (yb) is the probability of a brand extension if
the new product is of unknown quality and the old product is good (bad). In a Bayesian equilibrium,
consumers must take into account the possibility that the multi-product rm may not know quality.
For example, gg becomes
kgg 
r [kxgg + (1  k)yg]
r (k [xgg + (1  )xgb] + (1  k)yg) + (1  r) (k [xbg + (1  )xbb] + (1  k)yb) :
It is straightforward to see that for k < 1 an equilibrium with perfect positive quality correlation,
that is, of the form (1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0), is less likely to exist than for k = 1. In any perfect quality
correlation equilibrium, it must be that (g; g)  0 but (g; b)  0. For k < 1, an additional
constraint is that the rm does not want to extend its brand to a new product of unknown quality.
The expected average prot impact of umbrella branding in the latter case, let me denote it by (g),
is a weighted average of (g; g) and (g; b). Since (g; g)  0, the equilibrium constraint that
guarantees that products of unknown qualities are not sold under umbrella brands, i.e. (g)  0,
is at least as strict as the condition (g; b)  0. Similarly, since it must be that (b; b)  0, the
condition (b)  0 is at least as strict as the condition (b; g)  0.
One interpretation of the parameter k is that it measures the relatedness or t between the old
and the new product. Sellers are less able to evaluate the quality of new products that are far
from their core competencies. Consumers, upon observing the new products category and hence
t, anticipate the probability k with which the seller knows the new products quality. The above
arguments then suggest that if the t is bad (k < 1), an equilibrium with positive quality correlation
24The other main dimensions of t used in the literature are demand subsitutability and demand complementarity.
24
is less likely to exist.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that even if two products are unrelated from a technological point of view, the
decision to sell them under the same brand name can credibly signal to consumers that the products
qualities are positively correlated. In such equilibria consumers correctly believe that the qualities of
umbrella branded products are (likely or certain to be) identical, although consumers never fully learn
qualities. Previous theories analyze umbrella branding as a guarantee of quality instead (Wernerfelt
1988; Choi 1998; Hakenes and Peitz 2008, 2009; Moorthy 2010), or assume perfect quality correlation
for exogenous reasons (Cabral 2000).
Another key nding is that umbrella branding can lead to an hitherto unrecognized link between
rmsincentives to invest in the quality of new products and the qualities of their existing products.
Whenever umbrella branding signals positive quality correlation to consumers, the option to use an
umbrella brand strengthens investment incentives for rms that already sell a high quality product,
but weakens investment incentives for rms whose core product is of low quality.
My theory applies best to product categories where it is di¢ cult for consumers to assess quality,
such as high-tech products, expert services (lawyers, consultants,...), or drugs and some food cate-
gories. Brands play an important role as carriers of information about quality in such markets.25
In other product categories, such as fashion, a more important function of brands is probably that
consumers can signal something about their type (income, taste, connoisseur knowledge) to others
or to themselves by means of their brand choices. An umbrella brand can then be a protable way
to exploit the value of a brand that enjoys such a function (Pepall and Richards 2002).
Concerning future research, it seems very interesting, but di¢ cult, to analyze the size limits of
umbrella brands. Theories in which umbrella brands are a guarantee of high quality (Wernerfelt 1988;
Choi 1998; Hakenes and Peitz 2008, 2009) imply that rms have nothing to lose from adding ever
more high quality products to an umbrella brand. In a model as in this paper where consumers remain
uncertain even after repeated consumption, on the other hand, including an additional product may
be risky. If the failure of a small number of products in an umbrella brand is su¢ cient to convince
consumers that all products are likely to be of low quality, i.e., if negative feedback e¤ects are stronger
25See Tadelis (1999) and Hakenes and Peitz (2007) for models of name trading based on similar informational
assumptions as my theory.
25
than positive feedback e¤ects, one would expect that at some point rms would not want to add any
more products to an umbrella brand, even if all products are of high quality.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let i 6=  i 2 fo; ng. First note that since prices are linear in beliefs,
E
h
w

i(
i
 i)

  w  i(i) j qo; qni> 0
is equivalent to
E
h
i(
i
 i)  i(
i) j qo; qn
i
> 0 .
As explained in section 3.1, i(
i) is the probability consumers would assign to product i being good
given only the following two pieces of information: rst, the fact that product i is umbrella branded, and
second, its performance i:
i(
i) =Pr fqi= g j i, umbrella brandingg :
The belief i(
i
 i) is the probability consumers assign to product i being good given not only i and the
observation of an umbrella brand but also  i:
i(
i
 i) =Pr fqi= g j i, i, umbrella brandingg :
Since  i2fS; Fg, the following equality then directly follows from Bayesrule:
i(
i) = Pr f i= S j i, umbrella brandinggi(iS) (10)
+(1 Pr f i= S j i, umbrella brandingg )i(
i
F ):
As the belief that a product is good is a probability, any conditional probability assigned to a products
success must trivially lie between b and g. Therefore:26
Pr f i= S j i, umbrella brandingg2 (b; g) : (11)
Now consider the case q i= g. Since g >Pr f i= S j i, umbrella brandingg, it is a straightforward
implication of the equality in (10) that for any i2fS; Fg:
gi(
i
S) + (1  g)i(
i
F ) > i(
i) if and only if i(
i
S) > i(
i
F ). (12)
As i() is strictly increasing, i(iS) > i(
i
F ) if and only if 
i
S> 
i
F , which is the case whenever
successes have positive feedback e¤ects, i.e., for  > 0.
26The strict inclusion in the set (b; g) follows from the simple fact that  6= 0 is incompatible with umbrella branding
fully revealing the quality of one (or both) of the products to consumers.
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The total "expected feedback e¤ect" can be decomposed as follows:
E
h
i(
i
 i)  i(
 i) j qo; qn
i
= qi
h
q iS(
i
S) + (1  q i)S(iF )  S(i)
i
+(1  qi)
h
q iF (
i
S) + (1  q i)F (iF )  F (i)
i
:
The nding in (12) directly implies that if quality correlation is positive, so that iS> 
i
F , then both terms
between square brackets are positive. Hence, if  > 0, then
E
h
i(
i
 i)  i(
 i) j qi; q i= g
i
> 0: (13)
If quality correlation is negative on the other hand, so that iS< 
i
F , then
E
h
i(
i
 i)  i( i) j qi; q i = g
i
< 0: (14)
Conversely, (10) and (11) imply that for q i= b the inequalities in (13) and (14) are reversed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof will proceed as follows. First I show that in the limit case g = 1
(while all other parameters remain strictly between 0 and 1), a pure strategy equilibrium such that  = 1
exists if and only if 1> 0, b  b(r; ; ), and (r; ; ; b)   (r; ; ; b), where b(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1),
(r; ; ; b) 2 (0; 1) and (r; ; ; b) 2 [(); 1). Since prots are smooth in g, the statement made in the
proposition will follow from this result.
Suppose the rms strategy is
 
xgg; xgb; xbg; xbb

= (1; 0; 0; 1). Then, o= n, oS= 
n
S , and 
o
F= 
n
F .
To simplify notations, I dene   o= n, S oS= nS , and F oF= nF .
It is straightforward that if g = 1, then a single failure su¢ ces to convince consumers of bad quality:
lim
g!1
F (e) = 0 for any e2 [0; 1).
Moreover, since consumers expect umbrella brands to always sell products of uniform quality, the failure of
a single umbrella branded product su¢ ces to convince consumers that both products are bad:
lim
g!1
F= 0.
Hence,
lim
g!1
F (S) = limg!1
S(F ) = limg!1
F (F ) = 0.
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These observations, and the linearity of w(), imply that
lim
g!1
2(S; S)= (1  b)
0@ (1  ) [limg!1 S(S)  limg!1 S(r)]
+ [limg!1 S(S)  limg!1 S()]
1A ; (15)
lim
g!1
2(S; F )= (1  b)(1  )

  lim
g!1
S(r)

< 0; (16)
lim
g!1
2(F; S)= (1  b)

  lim
g!1
S()

< 0; (17)
lim
g!1
2(F; F )= 0: (18)
The expected marginal impacts of umbrella branding on second period prots are
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j g; g] = limg!12(SS); (19)
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j g; b] = b limg!12(SS) + (1  b) limg!12(SF ); (20)
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j b; g] = b limg!12(SS) + (1  b) limg!12(FS); (21)
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j b; b] = b

b lim
g!1
2(SS) + (1  b) lim
g!1
2(SF )

(22)
+(1  b)

b lim
g!1
2(FS) + (1  b) lim
g!1
2(FF )

:
An equilibrium with perfect quality correlation then exists if and only if the following four inequalities are
satised, so that the branding strategy (1; 0; 0; 1) is indeed optimal:
lim
g!1
(g; g) = (1  )1+ limg!1E [2(o; n) j g; g] 0; (23)
lim
g!1
(g; b) = (1  )1 +  lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j g; b] 0; (24)
lim
g!1
(b; g) = (1  )1 +  lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j b; g] 0; (25)
lim
g!1
(b; b) = (1  )1 +  lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j b; b] 0: (26)
To derive su¢ cient conditions under which (23) to (26) are indeed satised, I prove the following ve
statements step by step:
Step 1 In equilibrium, it must be that limg!1E [2(o; n) j b; b]< 0 and 1> 0.
Step 2 If 1> 0, then equilibrium condition (23) is satised.
Step 3 If 1> 0, then there exists a threshold b(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that
lim
g!1
(b; b) >max

lim
g!1
(g; b); lim
g!1
(b; g)

if and only if b <b(r; ; ).
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Step 4 If1> 0 and b <b(r; ; ), then there exist thresholds (r; ; ; b) 2 (0; 1) and (r; ; ; b) 2 [(); 1)
such that the equilibrium conditions (24), (25) and (26) are simultaneously satised if and only if
 2 [(r; ; ; b); (r; ; ; b)].
Step 1: For any qo2 fb; gg,
E[2(o; n) j qo; b] = qoE [2(S; n) j qn= b] +(1  qo)E [2(F; n) j qn= b] : (27)
In any equilibrium with  = 1, umbrella branding must be more protable for a rm with two bad products
than for a rm with a good old and bad new product. Clearly, for this to be true, it must be that
E [2(S; n) j qn= b] E [2(F; n) j qn= b] : (28)
Now consider the limit case g = 1. Since
lim
g!1
E [2(F; n) j qn= b] = b limg!12(FS)| {z }
<0
+(1  b) lim
g!1
2(FF )| {z }
=0
< 0,
(28) and (27) imply that
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j qo; b]< 0 for qo2fg; bg .
For a (b; b)-rm to be willing to umbrella brand, i.e., for equilibrium condition (26) to hold for some discount
factors, it is therefore necessary that
1>0, r
r + (1  r)(1  )> (1  )r + : (29)
It is straightforward to show that there exists a threshold r (; )2 (0; 1) such that (29) is violated if
r <r (; ) but holds for r 2 (r (; ) ; 1).
Step 2: Given the strategy (1; 0; 0; 1),
2(S; S) = w (S(S)) (1  )w (S(r)) w (S()) ;
which can be rewritten as
2(S; S)
(g   b) = [S(S)  S()] + [S()  S ((1  ) r + )]
+ [S ((1  ) r + ) (1  )S(r)  S()] :
The rst of the terms in this expression is positive because  > 0 implies that S> . The last term is
positive because S() is a concave function. Finally, the second term is positive whenever 1> 0 (see (29)).
Hence, if 1> 0 then 2(S; S) > 0.
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In the limit case g = 1, a rm with two good products is certain to experience two successes. Hence,
whenever 1> 0, then also
lim
g!1
(g; g) = (1  )1+ limg!12(S; S)| {z }
>0
> 0;
i.e., equilibrium condition (23) is satised.
Step 3: I now show that there exists a threshold b(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that
lim
g!1
(b; b) >max

lim
g!1
(g; b); lim
g!1
(b; g)

(30)
if and only if b <b(r; ; ). First, limg!1(b; b) > limg!1(g; b) if and only if
lim
g!1
E[2(o; n) j b; b] > limg!1E[2(o; n) j g; b]; (31)
Substituting for the expected prot di¤erences and simplifying, this condition rewrites as
b lim
g!1
S(S) < (1  ) limg!1S(r);
which is equivalent to
b

+ (1  )b2< (1  )
r
r + (1  r)b;
or
K(b)  b2 [(1  r)  (1  )r] +br  (1  )r < 0:
It is easy to see that K(0) < 0. Moreover, 1> 0 implies that K(1) > 0. Since K(b) describes a parabola,
there then exists a unique b1(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that K(b) < 0 if and only if b <b1(r; ; ). Using the
same line of reasoning, it is easy to show that there exists a b2(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that
lim
g!1
E[2(o; n) j b; b] > limg!1E[2(o; n) j b; g] (32)
if and only if b <b2(r; ; ). Dening
b(r; ; ) min b1(r; ; ); b2(r; ; ) ;
it follows that condition (30) is satised if and only if b <b(r; ; ).
Step 4: Steps 1 and 3 establish that if b <b(r; ; ), then
max [E [2(o; n) j g; b] ; E [2(o; n) j g; b]]<E [2(o; n) j b; b]< 0:
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It is straightforward to see that if these inequalities hold and moreover1 > 0, then there exists a non-empty
range

(r; ; ; b);(r; ; ; b)
2 (0; 1) such that the equilibrium conditions (24), (25) and (26) are simul-
taneously satised for any  2 (r; ; ; b);(r; ; ; b).27 Moreover, for  2  (r; ; ; b);(r; ; ; b),
the three equilibrium conditions (24), (25) and (26) are satised with strict inequalities.
To conclude note that, as long as r; ; b;  2 (0; 1), the equilibrium prots from selling each of the prod-
ucts are smooth in g.28 The statement in the proposition then directly follows from the results established
in steps 1 to 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: The rst step is to show that there cannot be any equilibrium in which
 =  1, i.e., xgg= xbb= 0 but xgb; xbg> 0. Such a strategy maximizes aggregate prots if(b; g);(g; b)  0
but (g; g); (b; b)  0. Hence, the following two conditions must hold in any equilibrium with  =  1:
(g; b) (b; b); (33)
(b; g) (b; b): (34)
Since the rst period impact of umbrella branding is independent of (qo; qn), condition (33) is equivalent to
E [2(o; n) j g; b] E [2(o; n) j b; b] ; (35)
Condition (35) is indeed satised, i.e., the (g; b)-type has higher incentives to umbrella brand than the
(b; b)-type, if and only if, given qn= b, the expected impact of a success of the old product on the prot
di¤erence between umbrella and separate branding is positive:
E [2(S; n) j qn= b] E [2(F; n) j qn= b] 0: (36)
I now show that this condition is always violated if  1
2
. First, note that, since prices are linear in
27It is obvious that the range of  for which an equilibrium exists is always included in (0; 1) here: since
 is the share of prots accruing to the second period, limg!1(qo; qn) can achieve any value between
limg!12(qo; qn) and 1 by letting  vary between 1 and 0.
28If r were equal to 1, for example, then beliefs may not be smooth: While for g = 1, it would not be clear
what beliefs consumers should hold following a failure (of either one of the products), for g almost equal to
1, they would always continue to believe that both products are good (even after observing two failures).
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beliefs, condition (36) can be rewritten as follows:
0 b
264(1  ) [S(oS)  F (oS)]| {z }
>0 (direct e¤ect)
+ [S(
n
S)  S(nF )]| {z }
<0 (feedback e¤ect)
375 (37)
+(1  b)
264(1  ) [S(oF )  F (oF )]| {z }
>0 (direct e¤ect)
+ [F (
n
S)  F (nF )]| {z }
<0 (feedback e¤ect)
375
 (1  ) [S(r)  F (r)]| {z }
>0 (direct e¤ect under separate branding)
:
Both in the case of a success or of a failure of the new product, which occur with probabilities b and (1  b)
respectively, the success of the old product has two di¤erent e¤ects under umbrella branding: rst, a positive
direct e¤ect on the belief consumers hold about the old product itself, and second, a negative feedback e¤ect
on consumersbelief about the new product. Under separate branding, the success of the old product only
has a positive direct e¤ect, whose size is independent of the new products performance.
Next, note that in any equilibrium such that  =  1 consumers must be convinced that the umbrella
brand sells one bad and one good product. This means that for any realization of performances, the
probability consumers assign to the new product being good must be the "complement" of the probability
they assign to the old product being good. Formally, for any (o; n):
o(
o
n
) + n(
n
o
) = 1: (38)
From this it follows that (given the new products performance) the positive (direct) e¤ect a success of
the old product has on the old product itself is exactly o¤set by its negative (feedback) e¤ect on the new
product: since for any n,
S(
o
n
) + n(
n
S) = 1 = F (
o
n
) + n(
n
F );
it is always true that 
S(
o
n
)  F (on)

=   n(nS)  n(nF ) : (39)
Substituting   S(on)  F (on) for n(nS)  n(nF ), I can then simplify condition (37) to
0  b(1  2) [S(oS)  F (oS)]| {z }
>0
+(1  b)(1  2) [S(oF )  F (oF )]| {z }
>0
(40)
 (1  ) [S(r)  F (r)]| {z }
>0
:
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This condition is clearly violated for any  1
2
. First, if the rm attaches the same or more weight to the
prots made on the new product, the negative feedback e¤ect of a success of the old product outweighs
its positive direct e¤ect, hence the rst two terms in (40) are negative. Second, successes always increase
prots under separate branding, so that the last term in (40) is negative for any .
Using the same line of reasoning, it is easy to show that for any  1
2
, rms with a bad old and a
good new product would prefer separate to umbrella branding, i.e., condition (34) would be violated. I can
conclude that the necessary conditions (33) and (34) are never simultaneously satised, and no equilibrium
such that  =  1 exists.
The next step is to show that there cannot be any negative quality correlation equilibrium in which
xgg= 1. In that case,  < 0 only if xbb< xgbxbg. It follows that both signaling e¤ects are positive: o r
and n . Moreover, by Lemma 1, the total impact of feedback e¤ects on expected prots is positive if
both products are bad. Therefore, (b; b) > 0, which implies that xbb= 1, a contradiction.
The nal step is to show that there cannot be any equilibrium in which xbb= 1 either. If  < 0 in
equilibrium, then oF> 
o> oS and 
n
F> 
n> nS . In the following, I will show that 
o
F< r and 
n
F< 
if xbb= 1. From this, it will directly follow that for xbb= 1 umbrella branding is unprotable, because it
deteriorates the beliefs about both products in all circumstances. Consider
oF=
rxgg(1  g) + r(1  )xgb(1  b)h
rxgg+(1  r)xbg
i
(1  g)+
h
r(1  )xgb+(1  r)(1  )xbb
i
(1  b)
:
It is easy to check that the belief oF is increasing in xgg. For any xbb= 1, the correlation  is negative if
and only if xgg< xgbxbg. Hence,
oF<
rxgbxbg(1  g) + r(1  )xgb(1  b)h
rxgbxbg + (1  r)xbg
i
(1  g) +
h
r(1  )xgb+(1  r)(1  )xbb
i
(1  b)
;
which simplies to
oF<
xgbr
xgbr + (1  r) r:
Using the same line of reasoning, it is easy to show that if  < 0 and xbb= 1, then
nF< .
Since  < 0, it follows that also oS; 
o< r and nS; 
n< . Therefore, 1< 0 and 2(o; n) < 0 for any
(o; n), so that (qo; qn) < 0 for any (qo; qn), which contradicts  < 0. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose (in negation) that there is an equilibrium in which only rms
with good old products extend their brands, i.e., xbg= xbb= 0; but xgg> 0 and/or xgb> 0. Since even good
products can fail (i.e., g < 1), consumers then believe that the old product is good with probability 1 in
both periods. Moreover, as qo is fully revealed, the old products performance does not have any feedback
e¤ect on the new product. Aggregate prots under umbrella branding are therefore independent of the old
products true quality.
For any given qn, if there is a di¤erence between (g; qn) and (b; qn), then this must be due to a
prots di¤erence under separate branding. Since prots under separate branding are always lower the higher
the number of bad products however, for any qn2 fb; gg:
(b; qn) > (g; qn):
This implies, however, that xbg xgg and xbb xgb, which contradicts the initial assumption. By the same
reasoning, it is easy to rule out equilibria in which umbrella branding fully reveals the new products quality.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: i) First consider the limit case  = 0, in which the decision to umbrella
brand is fully driven by its impact on the expected prots made from selling the core product. This expected
prot impact can be decomposed into two terms corresponding to the signaling e¤ect and the feedback e¤ects
on the old product, respectively. Moreover, the sign of the signaling e¤ect is independent of qualities. The
sign of the expected impact of the feedback e¤ect on the old product depends on the quality of the new
product however: by lemma 1, it is positive if and only if qn= g. Now consider any candidate equilibrium
such that  > 0. First, it is easy to see that the signaling e¤ect must be positive in any such equilibrium.
If it were negative, then for rms with a bad new product umbrella branding would reduce prots, since
both signaling and feedback e¤ects would reduce expected prots. If xgb= xbb= 0 however, then umbrella
branding does not signal any quality correlation. Therefore suppose that the signaling e¤ect is positive. In
that case, both signaling and feedback e¤ects increase expected prots for rms with a good new product.
This implies that xgg= xbg= 1 in any such equilibrium. For the signaling e¤ect to be indeed positive, it
must then be that xgb> xbb. This leads to a contradiction of the initial assumption  > 0, since - given that
good new products are always umbrella branded - positive correlation would require that bad new products
are more likely to be under an umbrella brand with other bad rather than good products.
Hence, for  = 0, there does not exist any equilibrium such that  > 0. Using the same approach, I can
rule out all equilibria such that  6= 0 for  = 1 or  = 0. Since prots are smooth in , it follows from
these results that equilibria with feedback e¤ects do not exist for  "too" close to 0 or 1 either.
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Non-babblingequilibria such that  = 0 are also impossible. Since there are no feedback e¤ects for
 = 0, whether rms want to umbrella brand or not will only depend on the signaling e¤ect on one of the
products, the sign of which is independent of qualities.
ii) If consumersprior about one of the products is already perfectly accurate, then umbrella branding
induces no feedback e¤ects. Suppose, for example, that r = 1. Then, the new products performance cannot
have any feedback e¤ect on the old product under umbrella branding, since consumers remain convinced
that the old product is good no matter what happens. Similarly, as the old products performance has no
direct e¤ect on the belief about the old product itself, it cannot have any feedback e¤ect on the new product
either: n= nS= 
n
F
 
= gg

. Umbrella branding has no signaling e¤ect on the old product either, since
consumers are already convinced of its quality. Branding incentives are hence driven by the signaling e¤ect
on the new product. The branding incentives of di¤erent types (qo; qn) are thus fully aligned, and umbrella
branding cannot credibly signal any quality information. As prots are smooth in r, it follows that for any
strategy and values of the other parameters, there exists a threshold of r above which the performance of
the old product does not a¤ect beliefs su¢ ciently for a non-babbling equilibrium to exist. I can use the
same line of reasoning to rule out non-babblingequilibria for r close to 0, or  close to 1 or to 0.
iii) If the weight attached to future prots approaches 0, then short term signaling e¤ects completely
drive the rms decision to umbrella brand or not:
lim
!0
(qo; qn) = 1.
In the limit, the incentives to umbrella brand are hence completely independent of qualities. By continuity,
this implies that for  su¢ ciently close to 0, only babbling equilibria can exist.29
iv) If b were equal to g, then performance would no longer yield any information about quality to
consumers. Formally, this would mean that for any initial belief , S() = F () =  . Hence,
lim
b!g
(qo; qn) = 1;
which is independent of (qo; qn). It then follows from continuity that for b su¢ ciently close to g, only
babblingequilibria can exist.
Q.E.D.
29Whenever 1 6= 0, the umbrella branding incentives of the di¤erent rm types are completely aligned for
all  below some strictly positive threshold. There may not exist any such strictly positive threshold of  if
1 = 0 and one signaling e¤ect is strictly positive, however. This case is neglected here because generically
it does not occur.
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Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that there exists at least one equilibrium that generates perfect
positive quality correlation between umbrella branded products. In what follows, let me denote by U (qo; qn)
and S (qo; qn), respectively, the mulit-product rms expected aggregate prots gross of investment costs
under umbrella branding and under separate branding, given qo, and qn as determined by the investment
decision. In line with previous notations, I use (qo; qn)= 
U (qo; qn) S (qo; qn). Note that in any
equilibrium with perfect quality correlation, it must be that(g; g) ;(b; b) 0 and(g; b) ;(b; g) 0:
the branding decision must be optimal for any given investment decision, otherwise the rms strategy (that
determines investment and branding jointly) could not be optimal in the rst place.
Investing in high quality is protable for an entrant if and only if the expected increase in second-period
prots exceeds the investment cost, i.e., whenever
c  
   [w (S (i)) w (F (i))] :
Given my distributional assumptions, in equilibrium the following condition implicitly denes i :
i =
 [w (S (i)) w (F (i))]
g   b : (41)
Clearly, i = 1 cannot be a solution. i = 0 solves (41), but cannot arise in an equilibrium with  = 1
nonetheless. If i = 0, then (b; g)> (b; b): (i) since consumers consider an individually branded new
product to be bad no matter what, separate branding would give the same prot for the two quality
proles, but (ii) under umbrella branding the expected prot is evidently higher for the (b; g)-prole than
for the (b; b)-prole. Hence, whenever(b; g) 0, then(b; b)< 0, which violates a necessary equilibrium
condition. Therefore, in any equilibrium with  = 1, it must be that i 2 (0; 1).30
Next consider a multi-product rm with an old product of quality qo= g. In any equilibrium with
perfect quality correlation, this rm will either invest and umbrella brand, or alternatively not invest and
use separate brands. Therefore, making the investment increases expected aggregate prots if and only if
S (g; b)  U (g; g) c
,
c  U (g; g) S (g; g)| {z }
=(g;g)
+S (g; g) S (g; b)| {z }
=

Since for  = 1 to arise it is necessary that (g; g) 0, we can conclude that ig i. Moreover, whenever
(g; g)> 0 (as is the case in such equilibria for g close to 1), then ig> i.
30A strictly positive solution of (41) indeed exists if  (g   b)2> (1  b) b, which is hence a necessary condition
for an equilibrium with perfect quality correlation here.
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Now consider a multi-product rm whose old product is of quality qo= b. In any equilibrium with  = 1,
this rm will either not invest and umbrella brand, or invest and opt for separate brands. Investing in the
high quality if therefore protable if and only if
U (b; b)  S (b; g)  c
,
c    U (b; b)  S (b; b)| {z }
=(b;b)
+S (b; g)  S (b; b)| {z }
=

:
Since (b; b) 0 is a necessary condition for an equilibrium with  = 1, the right-hand side of this expres-
sion lies (weakly) below 
. Hence, ib i. Q.E.D.
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